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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

SUTER V. STUCKEY: PARTIES TO A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
PROTECTIVE ORDER ENTERED BY CONSENT DO NOT
HAVE THE RIGHT TO AN APPEAL.
By: Lydia Hu
The Court of Appeals of Maryland determined that parties to a
domestic violence protective order entered by consent do not have the
right to an appeal. Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 935 A.2d 731
(2007). More specifically, the Court held that the Protection from
Domestic Violence Act does not abrogate the common law rule that a
judgment entered by consent may not be appealed. Suter, 402 Md. at
232, 935 A.2d at 744.
In April 2006, Darryl Stuckey ("Stuckey") was arrested for a
domestic violence incident in which he attacked his fiancee, Judith
Suter ("Suter"), in their home. One week later, Stuckey harassed Suter
at her place of employment, prompting Suter to file a petition for a
temporary protective order ("TPO") against Stuckey in the District
Court for Prince George's County. On April 13, 2006, the district
court issued the TPO and scheduled a hearing for the final protective
order on April 20, 2006. The court entered a final protective order by
consent.
On May 17, 2006, Stuckey noted an appeal to the Circuit Court for
Prince George's County. Suter moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing
that the appeal was time-barred and that Stuckey was estopped from
appealing a consent judgment. The circuit court granted the motion to
dismiss and affirmed the final protective order.
Stuckey subsequently requested an in banc review of the circuit
court ruling and argued that he was entitled to a de novo hearing in the
circuit court. The panel ruled that the statutes governing appeals from
district court to circuit court in domestic violence cases gave Stuckey a
right to a de novo appeal. The panel found section 12-401(f) of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("section 12-401 (f)")
controlling, which provides that appeals from civil judgments when
the amount in controversy is greater than $5,000 will be heard on the
district court record. Moreover, section 12-401 (f) provides that all
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other appeals will be tried de novo. The panel determined that the
instant case was an example of "every other case" to be tried de novo
because appeals from domestic violence protective orders are not
noted in companion exceptions. Thus, the panel reversed the circuit
court's holding and remanded the case for a trial de novo. The Court
of Appeals of Maryland granted Suter's petition for writ of certiorari to
address the question of whether parties to a domestic violence
protective order entered by consent have the right to an appeal.
Before addressing the case on the merits, the Court addressed the
threshold question of whether the case was moot. Suter, 402 Md. at
219, 935 A.2d at 736. A case is moot "when there is no longer an
existing controversy when the case comes before the Court or when
there is no longer an effective remedy the Court could grant." Id. at
219, 935 A.2d at 736 (quoting Dep't of Human Res. v. Roth, 398 Md.
137, 143,919 A.2d 1217, 1221 (2007».
The protective order at issue in the instant case expired on April 18,
2007. Id. at 219, 935 A.2d at 736. Even if the Court were to find that
Stuckey was entitled to a trial de novo, no relief was possible and
therefore the Court held this case was moot. Id. at 219, 935 A.2d at
736. However, the Court found it appropriate to address the merits of
the case because it "implicates an important public policy, it is likely
to recur, and on recurrence it will evade review." Id. at 220,935 A.2d
at 737.
Stuckey argued, and the in bane panel below found, that the plain
language of section 4-507 of the Family Law Article ("section 4507"), codified as part of the Protection from Domestic Violence Act
("the Act"), and section 12-401(d) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article, allow de novo appeals from protective orders
entered by consent. Suter, 402 Md. at 222,935 A.2d at 737-38. After
examining the legislative history of both statutes, the Court was not
similarly persuaded. Id. at 226,935 A.2d at 740.
When two statutes apply, the Court must first reconcile them, and
in the event they are contradictory, the Court must apply the more
specific statute. Id. at 231,935 A.2d at 743 (citing Md. Nat 'I Capital
Park and Planning v. Anderson, 395 Md. 172, 183,909 A.2d 694, 700
(2006». Section 4-507 is the more specific statute involved in the
instant facts, so the Court examined that provision first and reconciled
section 12-401 with section 4-507. Suter, 402 Md. at 231,935 A.2d at
743.
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The Act provides for a de novo appeal in section 4-507(b)(1), as
follows: "If a District Court judge grants or denies relief under a
petition filed under this subtitle, a respondent, any person eligible for
relief, or a petitioner may appeal to the circuit court for the county
where the District Court is located." Suter, 402 Md. at 216, 935 A.2d
at 734. Section 4-507(b)(2) further provides that appeals taken
pursuant to the above section shall be "heard de novo in the circuit
court." Suter, 402 Md. at 216, 935 A.2d at 734. The Court was not
persuaded by a plain language interpretation of section 4-507(b)(2)
and explained it must consider the statutory language as it is found
within the broader context of the Act to achieve the over-arching
purpose of protecting victims of domestic violence. Suter, 402 Md. at
231, 935 A.2d at 743. Allowing appeals from protective orders
entered by consent would invariably diminish the incentive for
domestic violence victims to enter into such agreements, thereby
undermining the purpose of the Act. Suter, 402 Md. at 231, 935 A.2d
at 743.
The Court also recognized a secondary legislative goal in reducing
the costs of implementing protective orders. Id. at 232, 935 A.2d at
743. The administrative costs of a trial are avoided when protective
orders are entered by consent. Id. at 232,935 A.2d at 743. Hearing de
novo appeals from consent protective orders would undoubtedly
increase administrative costs. !d. at 232,935 A.2d at 743.
When construing statutory provisions, the Court is bound by the
rule that the common law will not be repealed by mere implication.
Id. at 232, 935 A.2d at 734. The applicable Maryland common law
rule to the instant case is that "the only persons who may appeal a
judgment are those aggrieved by that judgment." Id. at 232, 935 A.2d
at 744 (citing Thompson v. State, 395 Md. 240, 248-49, 909 A.2d
1035, 1041 (2006». The established result of that common law rule is
that a consent judgment may not be appealed because a consenting
party cannot be aggrieved. Id. at 232-33, 935 A.2d at 744. The
legislature did not expressly abrogate or limit the common law rule
that a party may not appeal from a consent judgment, and the Court
refused to "read into [section 4-507(b)(1)] as an abrogation of the
common law rule." Suter, 402 Md. at 233, 935 A.2d at 744.
The Court further explained that section 12-401 can be construed
harmoniously with the Act because section 12-401(f) determines the
mode of appeal but does not grant or constrain the right of appeal.
Suter, 402 Md. at 234, 935 A.2d at 745. Rather, the grant of a right to
appeal in domestic violence protective orders is governed by section 4-
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507 of the Act and Maryland common law. Suter, 402 Md. at 234,
935 A.2d at 745.
By deciding this case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland helps
achieve the legislature's goals of protecting victims of domestic
violence. Suter is particularly important because entering domestic
violence consent orders at the district court level will now be treated as
if the parties have waived their right to appeal. The finality of consent
orders quickly ensures security for victims and provides the option of
avoiding litigation.

